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 Introduction 
Global patent policy has shown a trend of unifying international standards. As 
intellectual property can easily be duplicated and reproduced, it requires protection 
under a country’s jurisdiction. Global corporations lobby policymakers to standardize 
patent procedures to minimize the cost of expanding businesses. Therefore, the 
international discussion about unified regulations for patent policy has produced 
several results concerning the global structure of intellectual property. 
The unifying trend seems inevitable, but there are many national differences among 
patent regulations. In many low-income countries, patent protection has little effect 
on short-term economic growth because investment in research and development 
(R&D) is insufficient; thus, their protection policy tends to be loose. However, the 
research has also shown that fast-growing economies tend to have higher protection 
levels for patents regardless of their current GDP status. 
The differing levels of patent protection lead to two questions. First, how is the level 
of protection defined? Patent protection can be measured on several levels. It can be 
divided into two parts: the registration procedure and the legal protection of 
registered patents. Each has different effects on the practice of patent law. Countries 
have various levels of protection, and they differ especially in their administrative 
and judicial decisions concerning patent law. 
Second, how are patent protection levels related to economic growth? Studies on the 
effect of R&D focus on investment in knowledge to improve the technology level of 
a country. The patent system is implemented to improve R&D investment, but the 
effect is ambiguous because it can be observed only after a long period of time. 
Furthermore, the side effects of the patent system are longer-term and are more latent 
than its benefits. Thus, the actual effects of patent protection are controversial. Some 
argue that it should be strengthened while others claim that it does not help foster 
economic growth, especially in developing countries. There is also an extreme view 
that the patent system should be eradicated.   
Working through these questions, this paper examines the relation between patent 
protection and economic growth through empirical data using indexes currently 
available to analyze the current patent system. This paper focuses on Korea’s attempt  
to use the patent system to foster innovation. 
 
2. Literature review 
A. Theoretical Approach 
The theoretical literature offers an economic model of the patent system that 
compares costs to benefits. Most models are growth models with variables for patent 
protection that try to determine whether the effect of increased protection is 
beneficial to economic growth and consumer welfare. Those models are constructed 
on the assumption that the patent market is monopolistic and that R&D is the driving 
force of economic growth. 
In analyzing patent duration, Judd (1985)1 and Chou and Shy (1991)2 use a partial 
equilibrium model to argue that the patent duration that maximizes welfare is infinite. 
However, Iwaisako and Futagami (2003)3 argue that a finite patent with an efficient 
expiration period maximizes social welfare. They divide intermediate goods into 
patented and nonpatented goods and substitute those with factors of the CES 
                                           
1 Kenneth L. Judd, “On the performance of patents”, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, The 
Econometric Society, 1985, pp. 567–585. 
2 C.F. Chou, O. Shy, 1991. “The Crowding-Out of Long Duration of Patents” , Tel Aviv–The Sackler Institute 
of Economic Studies, 1991, pp. 8–91. 
3 Tatsuro Iwaisako and Koichi Futagami,  “Patent Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model”, Journal of 
Economics, 78(3), 2003, pp. 239–258. 
 
production function. Through these methods, they show that there is a welfare 
maximizing equilibrium. 
The argument of Iwaisako and Futagami is more plausible because side effects are 
observed from the patents themselves. As a patent forms a monopolistic market 
granted by the government, it inevitably reduces the consumer surplus. Supplier 
insufficiency over an infinite period can distort the market. Considering these side 
effects, maintaining a patent for an infinite period is unlikely to foster social welfare. 
However, these models have limited usefulness in determining national patent 
policies. Even though such policies have a considerable effect on production 
technology, they cannot be determined by patent duration only. Some models 
consider patent breadth, but these are incidental and oversimplify. Economic growth 
models for patent policy do not consider the dynamics and diversity of patent 
policies, which are deeply affected by other social factors. These models also 
consider knowledge development to be one-sided. The development of industrial 
sectors should facilitate the development of the patent system. Demand for better 
regulation pushes governments to change the laws to enhance the industrial 
environment. The correlation between industry and patent policy has been largely 
neglected in the theoretical approaches.  
 
B. Empirical Analysis 
Another research stream analyzes the performance of economies with a patent policy. 
Several indicators have been developed to analyze the patent policies of countries for 
the econometric analyses. Most of the indicators use dummy variables to reflect the 
protection level of a country (the country is given 1 if it has this policy feature and 0 
otherwise). Rapp and Rozek (1990)4 suggested an index for patent policy based on 
the dummy variable method with an aggregation of the numbers. 
However, indicators based on dummy variables share the flaw of economic growth 
models that oversimplify the dynamics of patent policies. To overcome this flaw, 
Ginarte and Park (1997)5 suggested an indicator that considers more of the parts of a 
patent than had been examined by earlier studies. Researching data from 60 countries 
covering 1960 to 1990, the study considered coverage, membership in international 
agreements, protection against patent losses, legal enforcement, and the duration of 
patent law protection. Using the indicator, the study evaluated the relation between 
patent policies and GDP per capita and other social factors. The indicator developed 
by Ginarte and Park was expanded by Park (2008).6 The index (known as the “IP 
Index”) reflects the degree of patent protection strength. Ginarte and Park used it to 
conclude that developed countries tended to have higher standards of patent 
protection. 
Based on these indexes, research on IP regulations and other economic indexes (such 
as GDP growth) has been conducted. Thompson and Rushing (1999)7 was early 
research that found a relationship between economic growth and IP protection based 
on the Rapp–Rozak Index. They regressed on the GDP growth rate, total factor 
productivity, and patent protection as dependent variables, finding that the greater the 
degree of open trade and income, the higher the education level, R&D infrastructure, 
and patent protection, while political instability had no significant relationship with 
                                           
4 R. T. Rapp and R. P. Rozek, “Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries”, 
Journal of World Trade, 24(5), p. 75–102. 
5 J. C. Ginarte and W. G. Park, “Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-national Study”, Research Policy, 26, 
pp. 283–301. 
6 Walter G. Park, “International Patent Protection : 1960–2005”, Res Policy, 2008. 
7 M. A. Thompson and F. W. Rushing, “An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Patent Protection on Economic 
Growth: an Extension”, Journal of Economic Development, 24(1), 1999, pp. 67–76. 
patent protection level. In determining the effects of patent protection on total factor 
productivity, they found that income level was related to the relationship between 
TFP and patent protection. When GDP per capita was higher than US$4,000 (1985 
dollars), it showed a significant and positive relationship; when it is less than the 
threshold, an insignificant relationship was observed. Similarly, Sattar and Mahmood 
(2011) 8  showed that the regression between GDP growth and IP index was 
correlated only for high-income countries.   
To determine how IP protection affects economic growth, researchers have examined 
the relationship between economic factors and IP regulations. One strand of research 
has investigated the relationship between IP regulations and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflow. Generally, the protection of intellectual property is assumed to increase 
FDI because it induces investment in R&D. Braga and Fink (1997)9 evaluated the 
relationship between patent protection and FDI inflow, finding that FDI inflow was 
significantly related with intellectual property rights (IPR); with their higher degree 
of intellectual property protection, countries can take advantage of knowledge-related 
FDI inflows. This conclusion was expanded by further research, such as Javorcik 
(2004)10 and Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004).11 Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) used 
sectorally disaggregated FDI panel data and the Ginarte–Park index to examine the 
relationship between FDI and IPR protection. They argued that stronger IPR 
protection helps induce more FDI. 
                                           
8 A. Sattar and T. Mahmood, “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth: Evidences from High, 
Middle, and Low Income Countries”, Pakistan Economic and Social Review, 49(2), 2011, pp. 163–186. 
9 C. A. Braga and C. Fink, “The Economic Justification for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns of 
Convergence and Conflict”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 72(2), 1997, pp. 439–461. 
10 B. S. Javorcik, “Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? Search of Spillovers 
Through Backward Linkages”, The American Economic Review, June 2004, pp. 605–627. 
11 P. Nunnenkamp and J. Spatz, “Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment: A Disaggregated 
Analysis”, Review of World Economics, Springer, 140(3), 2004, pp. 393–414. 
Another view is that stronger IP protection fosters technological development, which 
induces increased economic productivity. Kanwar and Evenson (2003)12 researched 
the relationship between IPR protection and technological change using R&D 
investment as a proportion of gross national expenditure to capture national increases 
in knowledge. As an explanatory variable, they used the Ginarte–Park index in a 
random effects model. They revealed that stronger IPR protection increased 
technological change.  
Empirical research has also examined the relationship between IPR protection and 
economic sectors based on limited indexes, but this research has several limitations. 
First, it is difficult to measure actual IPR protection levels. Most studies have used 
the Ginarte–Park Index, but they may lack sensitivity since their data are 
quinquennial. Problems of insensitiveness can arise in the research because the 
technology improves every year, and the economic environment changes 
increasingly rapidly. Second, the Ginarte–Park index covers only from 1960 to 2005 
and thus does not reflect changes in international conditions concerning intellectual 
property. The knowledge market is sensitive to changes in global market conditions 
because investment in R&D changes as profitability changes. Changes in the IT 
sector are not reflected in the data used by most of the research. Third, most 
empirical studies neglect the correlation between industry and IP regulations. 
Industrial regulation systems can be a factor in patent policy because they regulate 
the use of patents in actual industrial processes. Fourth, the indexes do not consider 
administrative and judicial practices, which differ from country to country. As most 
indexes consider only those patent laws that regulate patent application and 
procedures, research based on those indexes can be distorted. For example, if country 
                                           
12 S. Kanwar and R. E. Evanson, “Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur Technological Change?”, Oxford 
Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, 55(2), 2003, pp. 235–264. 
A has a longer duration of patent protection than country B but patents from A are 
much more likely to be overturned in patent court because patents from country B are 
more stable, patent protection in country A cannot be considered better than that in 
country B; however, IP indexes will consider that A has a better protection system. 
Much of the research has this problem. 
This paper tries to determine the relation between IP protection and economic growth 
based on a more comprehensive index. As regression-based research tends to 
oversimplify, this paper will examine the case of Korea, where economic 
development and the patent system are considered to be highly correlated. 
 
3. Economic model of IPR protection 
A. Three-step Framework 
An IPR protection system has a cyclic effect on an economy. A government that 
provides stronger IPR protection and expects stronger economic growth from the 
policy will try to take advantage of it. Chart 1 shows seemingly positive correlation 
between Gross World Product and IPR regulation. 
 * Note: The GWP data (5-year average) are measured in 2010 US dollars with PPP 
considered. It is the average of each year and the former four years. The GPI 
(average) is the mean value of the Ginarte–Park Index for 110 researched countries 
in the sample years. 
* Source: The GWP data (5-year average) were compiled by the Earth Policy 
Institute. The GPI (average) data are taken from Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park 
(2008). 
 
The Ginarte–Park index is the most useful tool for evaluating global IPR protection. 
It covers five categories of assessment: extent of coverage, membership in 
international patent agreements, provisions for the loss of protection, enforcement 
mechanisms, and duration of protection. The measurement scale ranges from 0 to 5, 
from no protection of intellectual property to perfect protection, respectively.   
Chart 1 shows that economic growth and patent protection have been on an 
ascending trend since the 1960s. Economic growth has been increasing consistently 
since the 1960s, while overall IPR protection increased rapidly after the 1990s, as 
TRIPS took effect. The drastic increase in IPR protection may have resulted from the 
economic globalization that accompanied the formation of the WTO and many FTAs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
YEAR 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
GWP(5Years Average) 3449 3977 4667 5334 5891 6289 6917 7367 8110 9043
GPI(Average) 2.13 2.22 2.27 2.28 2.4 2.44 2.46 2.58 3.05 3.34
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<Chart 1> Gross World Product Per Capita and Ginarte-Park Index
Moreover, developing countries have been under pressure to open their markets, 
which requires constructing patent systems to protect the technology of foreign 
enterprises. Thus, whether IPR protection and economic growth have a cyclic effect 
is ambiguous.   
Research has shown a direct relationship between IPR protection and economic 
growth. Gould and Gruben (1996)13 used the Rapp and Rozak index and concluded 
that a more open economy with stronger IPR protection had a higher growth rate. 
Thompson and Rushing (1999) concluded that IPR protection was more strongly 
related to economic growth in higher-income countries, which was again found by 
Sattar and Mahmood (2011). 
However, it is difficult to estimate the effect of IPR policy on an economy because 
IPR policy affects economies via many indirect paths. First, IPR protection affects 
R&D incentives, but it is difficult to measure the policy effect of this process. The 
Rapp–Rozak and Ginarte–Park indexes rely on a compilation of dummy variables. 
These indexes have limited power to capture the dynamic effects of IPR protection. 
Furthermore, assessing patent law using economic measures is not easy. For example, 
the South Korean government recently established a patent-approval linkage system 
in the pharmaceutical sector, but this policy is not considered by either index. 
Moreover, the economic effect of a policy depends on many social factors such as 
infrastructure, political stability, and culture, which are difficult to capture in the 
indexes. Moreover, IPR protection is expected to increase the technological level of a 
country, but its collateral benefit is an increase in intangible assets. The direct 
economic value of a patent received research attention because non-practicing 
                                           
13 D. M. Gould and W. C. Gruben, “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Economic Growth”, Journal of 
Development Economics, Elsevier B. V., 48(2), 1996, pp. 323–350. 
entities (NPEs) emerged and predated some cash-abundant companies.14 Intangible 
assets as a share of GDP are not negligible, representing around 5% to 10% among 
developed countries,15 but it is difficult to estimate the value of patent policies on 
intangible asset because several other factors are involved. The fluctuating value of 
patents is also a factor, because a critical dimension of their value is their potential. 
To deal with these difficulties, this paper examines IPR protection as a staged process. 
The first step is analyzing the effect of patent policy on R&D expenditure. Increased 
R&D expenditure is expected to increase knowledge, which forms the second step. 
The third step is the process whereby knowledge increases economic production 
through improved efficiency. These steps may not cover all aspects of IPR protection, 
but they capture the critical flow of the policy’s effects. 
 
B. Patent Policy and R&D Expenditure 
R&D expenditure is considered an incentive-related index of IPR protection. If IPR 
strengthens patent protection and provides a better chance to profit from technology, 
the private sector will exploit this chance by investing in R&D. It can also be inferred 
that, when a government is trying to boost its nation’s technology through the patent 
system, government investment in the R&D sector will increase. 
Arore et al. (2008)16 analyzed survey data on the US manufacturing sector and 
argued that there is an overall positive effect of patent protection on R&D across all 
manufacturing industries. They found that a patent protection premium had an effect 
                                           
14 The so-called “Patent Troll.” 
15 www.oecd.org/sti/inno/46349020.pdf; a new OECD project, New sources of growth: Intangible assets. 
16 A. Arora and M. Ceccagnoli and W. M. Cohen, “R&D and the Patent Premium”, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Elsevier B. V., 26, 2007, pp. 1153–1179. 
in all sectors but varied across industries and firm sizes. Chaudhuri (2007)17 found 
that the patent system was not a primary reason for Indian pharmaceutical companies’ 
investment in R&D. These studies showed that R&D expenditure was affected by 
patent policy but that the sensitivity of R&D expenditure on IPR protection varied 
significantly. 
From these studies, we can infer that there are positive relationships between patent 
policy and R&D expenditure but that they differ according to the composition of the 
industry at the country level. Kanwar and Evenson (2003) have shown that this holds 
for the country level using a regression on the Ginarte–Park Index with gross R&D 
investment.  
 
C. R&D Expenditure and Intangible Assets 
R&D expenditure and intangible assets are considered to be closely related because 
R&D expenditure is basically an increasing quality and quantity of intangible assets. 
However, it is almost impossible to estimate the value of intangible assets. Patents do  
not represent a nation’s total amount of intangible assets because they do not include 
expired patents or knowledge that has been accumulated as know-how for a long 
period of time; also, some innovations may not have been subject to patent 
applications due to particular patent strategies.18 These factors are not negligible. 
Thus, researchers use proxies for their empirical analysis. Park (2008) and Yang et al. 
(2014)19 used US patent applications of national entities as a proxy of knowledge 
accumulation. Patent applications and grants are easy to examine, and it is better to 
                                           
17 S. Chaudhuri, “Is Product Patent Protection Necessary in Developing Countries for Innovation? R&D by 
Indian Pharmaceutical companies after TRIPS”, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Working Paper Series 
no. 614 , 2007. 
18 Most patent systems require the disclosure of technology, with a few exceptions.  
19 C. Yang and Y. Huang, Y. and H. Lin, “Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Induce More Innovation? A 
Cross-Country Analysis”, Hitosubashi Journal of Economics, Hitosubashi University, 55(2), 2014, pp. 167–188. 
estimate the relationship between knowledge and the economy.  
 
D. Patent and GDP Growth Rate 
The patent system can affect GDP growth in two ways: one is by increasing 
intangible assets, which increases a nation’s total assets; the other is through 
innovation, which increases the efficiency of the gross economy. The former is not 
negligible but represents a relatively small portion of the effect of IP development. 
The most important problem is how the patent system affects GDP growth by 
increasing production capacity via knowledge development.  
 
4. Hypothesis 
A. Hypothesis 1 
Countries with stronger patent protection are likely to make significant R&D 
expenditures. Patent protection is assumed to be a private sector incentive because 
market participants will see the chance to gain monopoly power over a technology as 
a benefit. If expected profits are higher than the potential costs, they may try to join 
the patent system. R&D expenditure is a variable used to determine whether the 
patent system affects social incentives. The premise of this hypothesis is that the 
benefit is generally greater than is the cost for individuals. 
 
B. Hypothesis 2 
Countries with greater R&D expenditures have more patent applications. A patent 
application is not exactly equal to the value of the patent itself, but the value of a 
patent is hard to measure because a patent is regarded as only potential wealth. A 
patent has an imprecise future value; thus, evaluating a patent is difficult. As a proxy, 
the number of patent applications can reflect the strength of a country’s knowledge 
production. 
Hypothesis 2 is designed to examine the relationship between R&D expenditure and 
knowledge accumulation in a country. Kanwar and Evenson (2003),20 referring to 
Griliches (1990),21 argued that R&D investment is a better indicator than patent 
application or physical investment because it is more thorough and closer to inventive 
activity. However, R&D expenditures are not entirely related to technological 
advances, and patents are more directly related to technology and factor productivity. 
Thus, this paper seeks to determine the relationship between R&D expenditure and 
patent applications.  
 
C. Hypothesis 3 
Countries with greater R&D investment and more patent applications will show stronger 
GDP growth. More patent applications will increase a nation’s factor productivity. 
Technology level is hard to measure, but it can be observed by using the proxy of GDP 
change. We can assume that more patents will increase the productivity of a country. 
Moreover, as not all R&D investment is related to patents, we can assume a correlation 
between R&D expenditure and GDP growth.  
 
5. Empirical Evidence 
A. Model 
a. Hypothesis 1 
                                           
20 S. Kanwar and R. E. Evanson, “Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur Technological Change?”, Oxford 
Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, 55(2), 2003, pp. 235–264. 
21 Z. Griliches, “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey”, NBER Working Paper no. 3301, 1990. 
Gross expenditure on R&D should be defined by several national factors, including 
protection of patents. The regression formula is as follows: 
 
GERD = f(IPP, EDU, POP, TRADE, e)  
 
GERD denotes the proportion of gross expenditure on R&D out of GDP and is 
defined by the functions of intellectual property protection (IPP), education level 
(EDU), population (POP), and trade openness (TRADE), along with an error term (e).  
 
b. Hypothesis 2 
Patent application is influenced by R&D expenditure, along with protection. Thus, 
the regression formula is as follows: 
 
PAPC = f(GERD, EDU, GDPPC, POP, TRADE, IPP, e) 
 
GERD, EDU, TRADE, POP, IPP, and e denote the same thing in Hypothesis 1. PAPC 
denotes patent application per capita, and GDPPC denotes GDP per capita. PAPC is 
defined by the factors described above. 
 
c. Hypothesis 3 
The GDP growth rate is affected by R&D investment and patent applications. The 
formula is as follows: 
 
GDPGR = f(GERD, PAPC, GDPPC, POP, TRADE, EDU, e) 
 
GDPGR denotes the GDP growth rate, and the other factors are as in Hypothesis 2. In 
this formula, GDP growth rate is defined by R&D expenditure, patent applications, 
population, trade openness, and education level. 
 
B. Estimation Technique and Data 
Data are collected from 51 countries as described in Table 1. 
<Table 1>  
Group A Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States 
Group B Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Egypt, Georgia, India, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay 
 
Note: Groups A and B are divided according to the criterion of a 7,000 USD GDP 
per capita in 2001. Most Group A countries are developed, while most Group B 
countries are developing.  
 
The cross-panel data cover 2001 to 2012 and around 51 countries. The role of the 
patent system in the economies of both developing and developed countries is 
examined by studying countries with estimable data. The effects on the least-
developed countries (LDCs) and Africa are difficult to capture because few data 
sources exist. Only Bangladesh, Egypt, and South Africa belong to this group, but 
those countries may not be representative. These nations face difficulties in data 
research and patent system implementation because their infrastructure is not 
sufficiently developed and their educational level is too low for the exploitation of a 
patent system.  
Due to this problem with developing countries, this paper examines the relationship 
between the patent system and economic growth in “non-least developed countries” 
and creates a blueprint for the least-developed countries based on the result. The lack 
of data for LDCs suggests that knowledge development is difficult when basic needs 
such as for food and shelter are not met. Thus, research based on data from non-least 
developed countries may be more meaningful.  
Measuring the effect of patent policy on innovation requires a proxy for IPR 
protection. Most empirical studies have used the Ginarte–Park index, but it is limited 
due to its time gap. Some country-specific effects hold over time; these can be 
eliminated with a fixed effect (FE) or random effect (RE) estimator, depending on 
whether the effect is correlated with the explanatory variables. A Hausman test 
(Hausman 197822) can be used to determine which of the estimators is consistent and 
efficient. When the Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis, both models are 
reported. There is no reason to believe that homoskedasticity holds. The panel data 
are drawn from countries that have various economic statuses. The factors that are 
tested in the models may not be consistent based on economic or social factors; thus, 
robust standard errors are calculated. The content and source of the data are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
<Table 2> 
Variable Content Source 
GERD Gross expenditure on 
research and development  
United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Institute 
for Statistics 
IPP Survey on protection of 
intellectual property 
World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 
                                           
22 Hausman, J. A., Specification Tests in Econometrics, Econometrica, 46(6), 1978, pp. 1251–1271. 
PAPC Patent application per 
capita 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), WIPO 
Patent Report: Statistics on 
Worldwide Patent Activity. 
GDPGR, 
GDPPC 
2005 constant GDP per 
capita and its growth rate 
World Bank national accounts 
data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
EDU Gross enrolment ratio, 
secondary, both sexes (%) 
United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Institute 
for Statistics 
POP Total population World Bank World Development 
Indicator 
TRADE Trade, percentage of GDP World Bank national accounts 
data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
 
C. Results 
a. Relation between R&D expenditure and IP protection 
<Table 3> 
 Dependent Variable – GERD 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample 
[FE] 
GDP>7000  
[FE] 
GDP<7000 
[RE]              [FE] 
IPP 0.013 
(0.027) 
[0.035] 
0.009 
(0.439) 
[0.062] 
0.752*** 
(0.218) 
[0.026] 
0.687*** 
(0.023) 
[0.023]*** 
POP 0.117 
(0.389) 
[0.265] 
0.719 
(0.605) 
[0.522] 
0.078*** 
(0.018) 
[0.028]*** 
0.134* 
(0.072) 
[0.199] 
EDU 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
[0.006]* 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
[0.003]* 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
[0.004]* 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
[0.004] 
TRADE 0.008*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.008]*** 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
[0.003]*** 
0.0005 
(0.0006) 
[0.0012] 
0.0004 
(0.0007) 
[0.002] 
Constant 0.0004 
(0.199) 
[0.498] 
-0.134 
(0.434) 
[0.814] 
-0.539*** 
(0.154) 
[0.429] 
-0.513 
(0.0007) 
[0.529] 
R square 0.23 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Hausman Test 64.59*** 22.18*** 0.90 
N 51 26 25 
 
Note: Population is divided by 108 for simplicity. Figures in parentheses and square 
brackets are standard error and robust s.e. respectively, while *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 Table 3 shows a positive relationship between IP protection and R&D expenditure 
only for developing countries; no correlation was observed for developed countries. 
Many studies have shown a correlation between IP protection and GDP growth rate 
but the assumption of this paper is that IP protection’s effect on the economy through 
R&D holds only for developing countries. Robust standard errors show that the result 
for developing countries is not biased by heteroskedasticity. Policies in developing 
countries tend to be uniform over sectors, so that the higher the expenditure, the 
harder developing countries try to protect intellectual property. Meanwhile, IP 
protection among developed countries has become almost identical through trade 
negotiations such as for FTAs and trade unions. For example, most of the countries 
that have not joined the PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) are developing countries23 
(148 countries have signed the treaty). Among sample countries, all Group A nations 
are PCT members, while four Group B nations are not. This illustrates the diversity in 
IP policy among developing countries. 
There is possibility for developing countries’ stronger correlation is induced by the 
governmental intervention. As illustrated below, Korean government has intervened 
in development of IP system. Most of its expenditure on R&D came from the source 
of government in the early stage of economic development. There are tendency of 
simultaneity of R&D expenditure and stronger IP protection as a policy. Where 
private sectors are underdeveloped, governmental intervention may lead the 
expenditure on R&D along with brining stronger protection on IP. 
 
b. Factors affecting patent stock 
                                           
23 http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/pct_contracting_states.html. 
<Table 4> 
 Dependent Variable – PAPC 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample 
[FE] 
GDP>7000  
[RE]              [FE] 
GDP<7000 
[FE] 
GERD 12762.19*** 
(2547.51) 
[7032.60]* 
7944.01*** 
(2366.56) 
[4316.96]* 
6753.76** 
(2644.58) 
[4112.29] 
39977.81*** 
(4331.63) 
[27490.07]** 
IPP 3271.41** 
(1347.38) 
[2093.70] 
2443 
(1636.889) 
[2833.48] 
3330.23* 
(1694.87) 
[3393.73] 
823.31 
(1728.401) 
[1830.07] 
EDU 225.61*** 
(76.06) 
[224.62] 
-62.28 
(79.83) 
[56.12] 
-17.05 
(81.92) 
[43.25] 
427.80*** 
(103.44) 
[369.88]* 
TRADE -105.74** 
(49.13) 
[87.67] 
-55.33 
(46.34) 
[33.95] 
-25.49 
(60.85) 
[31.47] 
-33.80 
(40.39) 
[124.09] 
GDPPC 1.1609*** 
(0.3953) 
[0.6837]* 
0.4406 
(0.2937) 
[0.2703] 
0.7150* 
(0.3942) 
[0.4960] 
-2.5157*** 
(0.7079) 
[1.8819] 
Constant -59160.09*** 
(12115.2) 
[42035.66] 
-16719.58 
(15576.73) 
[19481.62] 
-34186.33* 
(17600.25) 
[35482.04] 
-44382.52*** 
(9873.30) 
[35505.51]** 
R square 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.46 
Hausman 
Test 
21.02*** 6.80 31.49*** 
N 51 26 25 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses and square brackets are standard error and robust s.e. 
respectively, while *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
Table 4 shows that the relationship between R&D expenditure and patent applications 
is ambiguous for developed countries but clear for developing countries. The IPP 
figures show that the effect of IP protection on patent applications is not significant 
when the effect is absorbed by R&D investment. This result has two implications.  
First, the number of patent applications is not an appropriate measure of the 
innovation level of developed countries. Yang et al. (2014) examine US patents and 
conclude that IP protection has a positive effect only on developed countries, not on 
developing countries. However, the number of patents granted in the US to non-
residents may not be feasible for most developing countries because their innovation 
level may not have reached an international standard. Thus, patents granted by most 
developing countries may lack economic potential and be useful only at the national 
level. This implies that IP protection and R&D expenditure help foster technological 
innovation even for developing countries at the early stage.  
Second, as explained in Table 3, the IP policies of developing countries may vary 
more than those of developed countries, thus diversifying the numbers of patent 
applications. The standard deviation is large in developed countries,24 but this does 
not mean that the effect of R&D investment is greater for those countries. Due to 
their smaller amount of national assets, developing countries find it harder to spend 
more on R&D. Thus, the focus on innovation of the governments of developing 
countries might be more extensive and narrow than that of the governments of 
developed countries, making the effect more pronounced. 
 
c. Factors affecting GDP growth 
<Table 5> 
 Dependent Variable – GDPGR 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample 
[FE] 
GDP>7000  
[FE] 
GDP<7000 
[RE]              [FE] 
GERD -5.18*** 
(0.96) 
[0.87]*** 
-5.73*** 
(0.94) 
[0.85]*** 
-1.47 
(1.25) 
 [0.75]* 
-1.46 
(4.18) 
[4.78] 
PAPC 1.79 
(1.90) 
[1.04]* 
1.97 
(2.24) 
[1.90] 
2.37 
(2.54) 
[1.76] 
1.05 
(4.05) 
[2.34] 
POP 1.72 
(1.92) 
[0.94]* 
-7.31 
(8.35) 
[4.65] 
0.43*** 
(0.13) 
[0.10]*** 
2.56 
(2.62) 
[1.65] 
EDU -0.023 
(0.029) 
[0.359] 
0.0008 
(0.2867) 
[0.0333] 
-0.008 
(0.027) 
[0.021] 
-0.079 
(0.075) 
[0.102] 
TRADE 0.067*** 
(0.017) 
0.078*** 
(0.021) 
0.119 
(0.008) 
0.067** 
(0.029) 
                                           
24 Standard deviations of GERD are 1.019 for developed countries and 0.375 for developing countries. 
[0.023]** [0.040]* [0.004]*** [0.029]** 
GDPPC 5.18 
(14.46) 
[18.38] 
12.20 
(14.01) 
[22.01] 
1.21 
(14.41) 
[7.25] 
-39.68 
(58.65) 
[70.95] 
Constant 4.04 
(3.95) 
[4.01] 
4.20 
(6.11) 
[5.66] 
4.57* 
(2.38) 
[1.66]*** 
[4.21]*** 
(6.12) 
[5.79] 
R square 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.13 
Hausman Test 33.23*** 35.30*** 5.62 
N 51 26 25 
 
Note: Population is divided by 108, and patent application and GDP per capita are 
divided by 105 for simplicity. Figures in parentheses and square brackets are standard 
error and robust s.e. respectively, while *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 5 shows how IP policy is disconnected from economic prosperity in developing 
countries. Expenditure on R&D along with innovation in intellectual assets showed 
no clear effect on the GDP growth rate at the traditional confidence level. Patent 
applications showed no clear correlation with ether group, while R&D expenditure 
showed a clearly negative relationship in developed countries. The result for 
developed countries shows that high-income countries have reached a point of steady 
growth; it seems to be the result of various social and economic factors in high-
income countries. Surplus production flows into R&D for the highest-income group 
more than for the middle-income group. The lower the income, the lower the 
proportion of R&D out of GDP tends to be, and a negative relationship is thus seen in 
the high-income group.  
For the low-income group, its coefficient shows no clear relationship among R&D 
expenditure, patent applications, and GDP growth. This result is in line with studies 
that have found that IP protection and economic growth are unrelated in low-income 
countries (e.g., Thompson and Rushing 1999; Satar and Mahmood, 2011). The lack 
of relationship may be caused by the problem of infrastructure. Generally, patent 
implementation is hindered when a country’s infrastructure cannot sustain its 
knowledge growth. For example, if a country lacks well-founded construction 
infrastructure, knowledge may not accumulate, explaining the repeated failure to 
observe a correlation between the patent system and economic growth in developing 
countries. The failure to observe a relationship between R&D investment and 
economic growth may be caused by a problem with capital accumulation. The 
realization of R&D requires long-term change with sufficient quantity, which 
developing countries may find difficult to manage. There seems to be a threshold 
level for R&D realization.  
 
D. Implications 
The implications of the regression results are complex. For the low-income group, 
there seemed to be no connection between patent applications and economic growth 
due to a disconnection between R&D expenditure and GDP growth. This shows that 
Thompson and Rushing (1999) and Sattar and Mahmood (2011), who found no 
relationship between patent protection and economic growth in developing countries, 
were correct about the disconnection between R&D expenditure and GDP growth. 
There needs to be sufficient R&D expenditure if developing countries’ R&D is to 
benefit the national economy.  
The results for developed countries are more complex. They suggest that the 
connection between R&D expenditure and the GDP growth rate can be negative, 
indicating that reinforcing patent rights can lead to negative effects on developed 
countries. This might be a premature conclusion, however, because the regression 
result does not contain all the social information that affects economic growth; it may 
lead us to focus on the side effect of the patent system. As mentioned, the patent 
system can hamper growth in knowledge production due to its monopolistic nature. 
In most countries, the limit of knowledge efficacy is around 20 years due to the rapid 
changes in technology, and, as stronger patent protection can increase R&D 
investment, it can also lead to an inefficient economic structure. The patent system 
may thus be protecting patents too strongly in developed countries.  
 
6. Case Study: Korea 
A. Introduction 
South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Its GDP per capita was 91.48 USD in 1961 but had increased to 25,976.95 USD by 
2013.25 South Korea’s rapid economic growth was historically unprecedented. Its 
cause has long been disputed. Its innovative capacity has been suggested as one 
reason for its development. South Korea’s government has facilitated knowledge 
development since the 1960s. Increases in both the quantity and quality of its 
intellectual property are also considered reasons for its rapid economic growth.  
 
<Chart 2> GPI index of Korea and Global Mean 
                                           
25 World Bank Data. 
 *Source: Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008). The data of Mean is from 115 
countries collected in the sources. 
 
<Chart 2> shows that the Ginarte-Park index of Korea has been constantly higher 
than the average of the world. It suggests better protection is provided in Korea than 
the rest of the world. Even though the development level was extremely low in early 
1960s, Korea maintained higher level of IP protection as an economic policy.  But 
Whether South Korea’s patent system has contributed to its innovation and economic 
growth needs more analysis. The Korean government has been trying to strengthen 
patent protection since introducing its patent law in 1961. This law was one of the 
policies meant to foster the economy at the early stage of development. Included in 
the policy package presented by Park Jung-hee, president during the 1960s and 1970s, 
the patent law went into effect in 1961.  
Patent applications have increased rapidly in recent decades. In 1960, patent 
applications by residents totaled 545, but this number had increased to 13,253 by 
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1991. It exceeded 100,000 in 2004 (105,250), and reached 159,998 in 2013.26 Patents 
increased as the economy boomed. The numbers of applications and grants are even 
greater than the EPO’s.27, 28 However, their quality and economic impact require 
further analysis.  
 
B. Patent System 
a. Patent admission 
To be admitted as a patent, four legal requirements must be fulfilled: (i) invention, (ii) 
industrial applicability, (iii) novelty, and (iv) inventive step.29 Of these, (i) invention 
indicates materiality, or at least potential materiality. The invention cannot be 
intangible. For example, an idea alone cannot become an invention and cannot be 
registered as a patent; it can be admitted as a patent only when it takes form through 
invention. (ii) Industrial applicability refers to a patent’s usefulness in improving the 
productivity of industry. It reflects the patent system’s goal of promoting economic 
development.30 (iii) Novelty and (iv) inventive step require patents to be novel and 
have a unique value. 
South Korea’s legal requirements are stricter than are those in the US on paper. For 
example, the industrial applicability provision requires that the invention be used 
only in the relevant industry. This is stricter than the “usefulness” requirement under 
§101 of the US Patent Act.31 This provision excludes inventions with solely family 
                                           
26 WIPO Data. 
27 European Patent Office. 
28 In 2013, applications  totaled 147,869, and domestic applications totaled 73,420. Korea’s applications 
totaled 204,589 overall.  
29 Korean Intellectual Property Organization, Understanding the Patent Act of the Republic of Korea 3, 2007. 
30 Korea’s Patent Policy and Its Impact on Economic Development: A Model for Emerging Countries? Jay 
Erstling, San Diego International Law Journal, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2010. 
31 Id. P. 450 
or private uses. In practice, however, this requirement does not pose a severe 
limitation on patents. The Patent Court of Korea stated the following about industrial 
applicability: “Based on the trait of the patent, if a person with ordinary knowledge 
in the field can produce the invented product with the patent application and its 
detailed description considering the purpose, composition, effect and etc., it has 
industrial applicability.” 32  Thus, the provision functions only as a minimum 
requirement of patent application. In practice, Korea’s patent application process is 
very lenient, as discussed below. 
 
b. Protection System 
South Korean patent protection is not limited to judicial procedures; it also includes 
administrative actions, assistance for patent holders, and even grant procedures in 
patent offices. The term “patent protection” denotes (in a limited way) protection 
provided for patent holders via administrative or judicial procedures. Most patent 
protection indexes, such as the Ginarte–Park index, follow this limited meaning. 
Patent protection in Korea has three bases: (i) infringement (civil procedure); (ii) 
validity (patent court); and (iii) criminal procedure. As do Germany and Japan, Korea 
separates infringement cases from validity cases. Infringement cases are dealt with in 
a local civil court, while patent validity cases are decided in patent court.33  
In validity cases, the patent court decides whether the patent has fulfilled its 
requirements. It is generally considered an aggressive measure, but verifications of 
the scope of a patent right are used as a preemptive strike against an offender before a 
complaint is made or an infringement suit is filed. When a patent holder wins a 
                                           
32 Patent Court of Korea, Decision 2014. 10. 15. 2003HEO6524.  
33 Jurisdiction over infringement and patent cases will be unified in 2019. 
validity case, the court’s decision is beneficial for the holder, as the defense works as 
protection. Validity cases require a decision from the Patent Judgment Division of the 
Patent Office because the court lacks professional knowledge of technology issues. 
Infringement cases are deemed civil cases, so that the civil law applies. Civil code 
Clause §750 states that unlawful infringement of another person’s right with 
intention or negligence should be compensated. Generally, the decision of the Patent 
Judgment Division of the Patent Office is considered powerful evidence, and the civil 
court makes its decision based on those documents.  
One of the interesting features of the Korean patent protection system is its widely 
used criminal procedure. Patent laws in the US and U.K do not include criminal 
procedures, and their usage is very limited in countries such as Japan and France. In 
Korea, however, complaints filed with investigative entities are used to press 
offenders and protect patent rights. This situation is explained below.  
 
C. Relationship between Patent Protection and Economic Growth 
The patent system cannot work properly without industrial development. A country 
lacking newly developing industries may have an economy with weak potential. The 
Korean economy has utilized the patent system to flexibly change its industry. Before 
the 1960s, the country’s main income source was agriculture; this changed to small 
industries and then to heavy industries. Recently, the country transformed its 
industrial base through IT technology.  
 
  
<Chart 3> Relationship between GDP and GPI 
 
*Note: GDP data are measured in current US dollars. GPI (average) is the mean 
value of the Ginarte–Park Index for the 110 sample countries over the sample period. 
*Source: GDP data come from the World Bank. GPI (average) data come from 
Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008). 
 
There is a debate about the effect of patent policy on Korea’s rapid economic growth. 
Jay Erstling concluded that the role of patents was decisive in Korea’s economic 
development:  
While it is impossible to quantify the degree to which Korea’s policy of building 
patent capacity has contributed to Korea’s rapid growth, there is little doubt that 
Korea’s emphasis on creating a patent system that has emphasized capability 
building and technological development has played a substantial role. A quick 
look at Korean patent statistics shows that Korean patenting activity has increased 
and matured as the Korean economy and technological infrastructure grew.34 
  
However, the emphasis on patent policy was limited after the formation of Korea’s IP 
market. In the 1960s and 1970s, Korean industry was developed chiefly by the 
government, and private entities had little management autonomy. Government 
intervention in the market was strong, and the free market system had little space to 
                                           
34 Jay Erstling and Ryan E. Strom, “Korea’s Patent Policy and Its Impact on Economic Development: A Model 
for Emerging Countries?” San Diego International Law Journal 441, vol. 11, 2010 Spring, p. 474. 
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operate. Amid these conditions, the effect of the patent policy was limited because 
R&D investment was not motivated by patent profits. Government was the largest 
source of R&D in Korea before the 1980s. The ratio of government to private R&D 
expenditures was 97:3 in 1960 and 71:29 in 1970.35 Investments by government were 
not induced by patent protection because the policy aimed at the private investment 
of resources. As Chart 2 shows, Korea’s GPI was under 3.0 during the rapid growth 
from 1960 to 1990, though it showed some improvement. 
The Korean government’s economic policy from the 1960s through to the 1980s 
included a concentrated development plan to foster growth through a small number of 
large corporations. As the position on global economy was ‘fast follower’36, the 
innovation of Korea has been focused on importing intellectual properties of 
developed countries. Most of the R&D expenditure was spent to catch up to the 
developed countries. Korea had the advantage of low labor costs and tried to import 
intellectual property that could utilize that strength. Korea’s patent policy couldn’t 
affect economic development the way such policies had in other developed countries 
because Korea lacked the social infrastructure required to use the policy. 
Korean patent policy hasn’t shown a distinctive effect on economic growth, but it 
made Korea’s industrial transition possible. To induce R&D investment for 
knowledge, i) there should be resources available for investment, ii) the knowledge 
should be strongly protected, and iii) it should be profitable. Profitability was enabled 
by the high level of GDP growth in the 1960s and 1970s, and protection was provided 
by the patent policy, including the patent law and its implementation. The problem 
was resources, but, as Korea’s market expanded, resources increased through a 
                                           
35 Jeong Hyop Lee, “Evolution of Republic of Korea’s R&D System in a Global Economy”, Science and 
Technology Institute of Korea, 2011, p. 55. 
36 Nayanee Gupta et al., “Innovation Policy of South Korea”, Institute for Defense Analysis, 2013, p. 25 
process that led to a transition in the source of R&D expenditure. Korea’s public–
private R&D expenditure ratio changed from 97:3 in 1960 to 19:81 in 1990, and 
Korea’s gross national expenditure on R&D increased from 4 billion dollar to 4,676 
billion dollars in the same period.37 The increased level of R&D, which caused rapid 
innovation in the private sector, allowed the economy to produce high profits over the 
long term and made the country flexible as its economic environment changed. The 
transformation of the Korean economy occurred through several steps, from 
agriculture to small industry, and then to heavy industry and the IT industry. Without 
firm and stable protection of patents and increased investments in R&D, this 
transformation would have been impossible.  
 
D. Problems with Korea’s Patent System  
- The problem of inequality 
The patent system has side effects. Strong patent protection can hamper the 
development of other inventions, and, if too many patents without economic value are 
allowed, they can harm the credibility of the intellectual property market and impede 
R&D investment. Korea features an extreme wealth imbalance among corporations, 
and this asymmetry involves the patent system. Large conglomerates, which account 
for only 0.9% of Korean firms, represent 2/3 of corporate sales in Korea.38 Up until 
2015, these large conglomerates made more patent applications than did small 
businesses.39, 40 
                                           
37 Id. P. 55. 
38 Ministry of Statistics of Korea webpage 
(http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1325). 
39 The number of patent applications by small firms exceeded that of large firms in 2015 for the first time.  
Inequality in business is a factor that can obstruct the development of an economy. As 
holding patents requires expenditures such as maintenance fees and legal fees for 
dispute resolution, it is difficult for small entities. Samsung Electronics, the largest 
corporation in Korea, holds around 103,000 patents and pays more than 100 billion 
KRW (around 90 million dollars).41 Small corporations don’t have the capacity for 
such expenditures.  
This imbalance in the Korean economy makes it harder to facilitate economic growth 
through knowledge. The patent system can be important when the open source of 
knowledge helps small economic entities develop their knowledge or use the 
knowledge of expired patents to produce better products. It can stimulate winning 
entities such as large conglomerates in Korea to invest in R&D and develop their 
knowledge. However, this will not happen if inequality in the economic structure is 
too severe. In such a case, the patent system is a barrier for large corporations. 
Evidence of this problem can be observed in patent suit statistics. Gwansik Kim 
showed that there is an inequality in patent litigation.42 The research focused on 656 
patent infringement indemnity cases from 2009 to 2013. He showed that, when the 
defendant was a large corporation, the winning percentage was 9.4%, but, for smaller 
firms, the number increased to 29.3%;  moreover, no small firm won a patent case 
against a large corporation as a plaintiff. 43 Reasons for this phenomenon may vary. 
Large and small corporations have different capacities for dealing with IP problems 
and may also have different capacities for producing effective knowledge.  
                                                                                                                                   
40http://www.kipo.go.kr/kpo/user.tdf?a=user.news.press1.BoardApp&board_id=press&cp=1&pg=1&npp=10&c
atmenu=m03_05_01&sdate=&edate=&searchKey=2&searchVal=%B4%EB%B1%E2%BE%F7&bunryu=&st=
&c=1003&seq=15426) . 
41 http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/05/29/2013052903858.html. 
42 Gwansik Kim, Teukhusosongeui hynhwanggwa gwajae (“Patent System and its Problems at Present”), Patent 
Suit Practice Association of Korea, 2015. 9., p. 9.  
43 Id. P. 9. 
The economic inefficiency of this inequality can be amplified through the patent 
system. Korean patent statistics suggest an inequality-driven inefficiency. Even 
though the GDP growth rate skyrocketed from 1960 to 2000, the expansion of patent 
numbers was not associated with economic growth. Patent applications increased 
about tenfold from 1991 to 2013, but GDP growth did not follow and increased only 
a little more than threefold.44 The expansion in patent applications is too large 
relative to the economic growth rate, suggesting that the economy is not producing 
knowledge effectively and that the patent system associated with the economic 
structure is obstructing knowledge utilization in lower parts of the economy. 
 
- Problem of Maintenance 
Economic impacts and their potential cannot be determined by the government or 
patent office. The future of an invention cannot be predicted exactly, so that most 
countries have a minimum level of sufficiency requirements. However, actual 
protection levels differ among countries. To promote the development of intellectual 
property and patent registration, KIPO has implemented many policies for educating 
the general public and companies since its early stage, as discussed. KIPO has 
become one of the largest patent registration offices in the world. More patents are 
granted by KIPO than by the European Patent Office (EPO).45 
 
<Chart 4>  Patent Maintenance Rate of Five Major Patent Offices in 2012 
                                           
44 World Bank data. 
45 Five IP Offices, IP5 Statistics Report, 2013 edition, p.7, p. 15.   
 Source: IP5 Statistics Report 2013, Edition. Raw data is from 
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2013edition.html.  
Note: Each graph refers to the European Patent Office (EPO), Japan Patent Office 
(JPO), Korea Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), State Intellectual Property Office 
of the People’s Republic of China (SIPO) and United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO). The vertical axis denotes maintenance rate through the years on the 
parallel axis.  
 
Chart 2 shows one of the problems KIPO faces. Naturally, patents can be inefficient 
to maintain because that may be inefficient to utilize after registration, or new 
technology might be more efficient. Some patents are registered for future application 
against competitors but are revealed to not have the expected outcome. In any case, 
the cost of holding a patent might exceed the benefit, including expected future 
profits. It is thus common for patent holders to drop their rights.  
However, the rate of maintenance is too low in Korea, as Chart 2 shows. The ten-year 
maintenance rate is only 63%, and the twenty-year maintenance rate is only 3%. 
Compared to the USPTO rates of 86% and 48%, respectively, these numbers are 
extremely low, indicating that the Korean patent system is not working effectively, 
given the large number of patent applications and grants. 
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One of the problems the Korean patent system faces is a high overturn rate in dispute 
resolution procedures. As required by the patent law of Korea, around half of 
disputed validity cases are judged by the Patent Judgment Division. In 2014, 52.8% 
of cases were for full revocation by the division; if partial revocation decisions are 
included, the number rises to 62.1%.46 This high revocation rate is a problem in 
many developed countries. Miller (2013) found that, among 980 US patent cases, the 
court fully or partially invalidated the patent in 37% of the cases from 2000 to 2010.47 
In Germany, the court maintained the patent’s validity in only 26% of the cases.48 
The possibility that a patent can be easily revoked poses a great risk for patent 
holders and makes them act passively in disputes.  
Concerning infringement, Korea’s patent protection policy is insufficient compared 
with that of other IP 5 countries,49 especially the US. The amount of compensation is 
smaller than in the US. An estimate of Seoul National University shows that the 
compensation level is only about 1/12.9 of that in the US, even when the difference in 
the size of their markets is considered.50 Moreover, unlike the US, Korea imposes no 
punitive damages, and the compensation must match the loss.  
The criminal procedure has been widely used. Unlike for trademarks or copyright, 
TRIPS51 does not state that infringements of patents should be included in the 
criminal procedure. It allows its member countries discretion about whether to punish 
                                           
46 KIPO data (www.kipo.go.kr). 
47 S. P. Miller, “Where’s the Innovation? An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious 
Patents”, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 18, 2013, p. 45. 
48 Joachim Henkel and Hans Zischka, “Why most patents are invalid – Extent, reasons, and Potential Remedies 
of Patent Invalidity”, Technische Universitat Munchen, 2015. 
49 Association of patent offices of Korea, Japan, Europe, the US, and China. 
50 Seoul National University R&DB Foundation, “Jijaegwon sosongaeseo sonhaebaesang sanjungui jukjulsung 
hwakbobangan (Research on the method to provide appropriate compensation on IP suit)”, National 
Commission of IP Final Report, 2012, p. 190. 
51 TRIPS, part 3, section 1, article 61. 
offender, but the patent law of Korea states that those who infringe a patent should be  
imprisoned with hard labor for less than seven years or fined less than 100 million 
KRW (around 90 thousand USD).  Reported cases of patent infringement as 
criminal cases totaled 767 in 2013, which is relatively high compared to only six 
cases from 2004 to 2008 in Japan, which has a similar clause in its patent law. 
However, the protection provided by the criminal procedure is very weak because 
most of the cases are dropped and only a few go to court. The indictment rate in 2013 
was 3.4%. Investigations are done by the police and prosecutor’s office, which lack 
professional knowledge of technology. Prosecutors tend to drop cases until the final 
decision on validity cases are made by the court or the Judgment Division of the 
Patent Office. Thus, the criminal procedure does not provide sufficient protection for 
patent holders. In practice, it is used only to press defendants in patent infringement 
cases for compensation.  
The problem with the patent protection system is that small companies and individual 
inventors are exposed to the risk of patent loss. Generally, legal expenditures on 
patent cases are higher than are those on ordinary court cases because these cases 
require technological knowledge and frequently involve appraisals. For small 
corporations and individual inventors, the price of holding patents might be 
unbearable. This can make the lower part of the economy vulnerable, as intangible 
assets become ambiguous.  
 
E. Policy Implications 
Korea’s patent system can be a model for countries seeking to promote economic 
growth with innovation and knowledge development. As the economy develops and 
education associated with industry functions well, a high level of protection provided 
by government can foster industrial development in later stages, when infrastructure 
is well-founded, and catch up with developed countries. It also allows the economy to 
transition to other types of industry and respond to external changes. It is doubtful 
that Korea’s patent policy fostered economic growth in the early stage of 
development, but the country has successfully changed its core industry from low-
tech to high-tech industry such as the IT industry with the help of its patent policy. It 
also allowed the country to smoothly change its source of R&D expenditure from the 
government to the private market, which made the country grow strongly. Patent 
applications and grants have increased significantly throughout the 20th century. 
From the 1960s to recent years, Korea shows that providing better patent protection 
can enhance economic growth.  
However, the system has several problems despite the increased quantity of patent 
applications. Korea’s technology level is high, but it relies on only a few firms, and 
its patent policy is limited in protecting small and medium-size companies. The 
heavy reliance on large conglomerates has been successful in the past, but as the 
economy grows, the inflexibility of the system makes it doubtful whether the 
economy will succeed in the future. To enhance performance, the policy should 
guarantee better protection for lower parts of the economy. 
 
7. Conclusion 
A patent system is essential for modern countries, including developing countries. A 
patent policy is required in a nation’s comprehensive growth plan. However, the 
effect of strong IP protection has been overstated. As free trade has become a norm of 
the global economy, IP protection has become more important, leading to multilateral 
agreements such as TRIPS and PCT. However, this trend is not based on 
concentrated research, which should analyze the relationship between the economy 
and the patent system. This paper suggests that thorough research on individual 
countries is required. Both the benefits and costs of IP protection should be 
considered. 
Korea has fostered economic growth by providing better patent protection. It has 
shown exceptional performance in the knowledge market and has effected a 
significant economic transition. However, the country is heavily dependent on a small 
number of corporations that fuel the economy, and it is questionable whether the 
system can support future economic growth. To improve its performance, Korea 
should provide a more stable system for R&D investors and individual inventors.  
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